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1  Introduction
The evolution of reasonableness as a standard of review has been one 
of the most significant developments in both socio-economic rights and 
administrative justice jurisprudence in South Africa under the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). However, the 
relationship between the development of reasonableness in these two areas 
of law has not received much attention and they remain seemingly distinct 
developments. At the same time, our courts’ reasonableness model of judicial 
review for socio-economic rights has been variously criticised and praised as 
one premised on an administrative-law conception of review.1 That is meant 
to convey a model that is relatively process orientated and pays little regard 
to developing the substance of the normative content and obligations imposed 
by socio-economic rights. Critics thus argue that such an administrative-
law reasonableness model of review is ill-suited for socio-economic rights 
adjudication.2
But reasonableness is also argued to hold distinct advantages as a standard 
of constitutional review over more “absolutist” methods of interpreting rights. 
* Our thanks to the participants at the Law and Poverty Colloquium for responses to the paper and in 
particular to Katie young and Petrus Maree for valuable comments on an earlier draft
1 See, generally, CR Sunstein “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa” (2000-2001) 11 
Constitutional Forum 123; D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights 
Jurisprudence, or ‘What are Socio-Economic Rights for?’” in H Botha, AJ van der Walt & J van der Walt 
(eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2004) 33; DM Davis “Adjudicating the 
Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards ‘Deference Lite’?” (2006) 23 SAJHR 
301  See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 173
2 See Brand “Proceduralisation” in Rights and Democracy 51-56; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 173
       
Sadurski3 identifies two such advantages. First, reasonableness review 
promotes greater transparency in legal reasoning4 in that the competing 
value and policy considerations at stake, and the method and choices made in 
weighing them are openly acknowledged and set out in the reasoning. Second, 
reasonableness as a standard in judicial review is “consensus-orientated” in 
that it acknowledges that valid constitutional considerations and arguments 
are frequently made by both parties, and judicial review in the context of 
constitutional rights seeks to attain as far as possible to reconcile and 
accommodate competing values and interests.5 Della Cananea points out that 
a reasonableness standard differs from a more rigid rule-based standard “in 
the sense that it escapes any all-or-nothing logic”:
“It instead makes it necessary to carefully weigh and balance all the circumstances in a case and all 
matters of fact and law. Which means that the kind of judicial review the principle involves goes well 
beyond the traditional review by which to determine legality.”6
This conception of reasonableness review avoids normative closure and is 
capable of stimulating deliberative democracy both in court and in the broader 
public sphere.7 It supports a dynamic concept of law, where law is responsive 
to changing circumstances and socio-political contexts. Sadurski observes that 
reasonableness involves a continuum or band between weak reasonableness 
aimed at the exclusion of manifestly unfair or irrational consequences,8 and 
reasonableness in the strong sense of a proportionality analysis.9
3 W Sadurski “Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics” in G Bongiovanni, G Sartor & C 
Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and Law (2009) 129 145-146  He describes reasonableness review as follows:
“By showing all the ‘ingredients’ of his/her reasoning, a judge conducting the proportionality analysis 
indicates that the final conclusion is not a result of a mechanical calculus: a syllogism in which the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, but rather the outcome results from a complex, 
practical reasoning, in which significant but often mutually competing values have to be considered 
in their actual social context… [P]roportionality analysis is more conducive to critical analysis and 
dissection of its elements than the ‘absolutist’ analysis which focuses on one constitutional right and 
on a thorough examination of its meaning ” (139)
4 On the significance of promoting transparency of legal processes and legal reasoning for the project 
of transformative constitutionalism and deepening democratic culture, see K Klare “Legal Culture and 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 170-171  
5 This concept of reasonableness facilitates the relational, dialogic and fluid notion of constitutional 
rights and judicial review developed by scholars such as Jennifer Nedelsky “Reconceiving Rights as 
Relationship” (1993) 1 Rev of Constitutional Studies 1; and Henk Botha “Metaphoric Reasoning and 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (2003) TSAR 20  
6 G della Cananea “Reasonableness in Administrative Law” in G Bongiovanni, G Sartor & C Valentini 
(eds) Reasonableness and Law (2009) 299 307
7 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 163-186
8 Sadurski describes this standard of review as “safety valve” reasonableness and points out its connection 
with the standard laid down for the review of administrative decisions in Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223  See Sadurski “Reasonableness” in Reasonableness 
and Law 131-132
9 Reasonableness in the strong sense involves two primary stages of inquiry:
Stage 1: The identification of the aim or purpose of a given measure, and an assessment of its nature 
and importance
Stage 2: A three-tiered proportionality test, posing the following questions:
a)  Are the means adopted “suitable” or “reasonably and demonstrably justified”?
b)  Do the means adopted limit the constitutional rights in the least restrictive way (the “least 
restrictive means test”)?
c)  Do the advantages of accomplishing the purpose outweigh the disadvantages and costs of restricting 
the specific constitutional right – “costs and benefits” analysis (proportionality sensu stricto)
Sadurski “Reasonableness” in Reasonableness and Law 133-134  See the similar, but not identical 
formulation under s 36 of the Constitution
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In this paper we argue that an approach to reasonableness review that builds 
on the development of reasonableness as a standard in both administrative 
justice and socio-economic rights jurisprudence offers us a strong and coherent 
model of judicial review. In our view an analysis of these developments in the 
two areas shows how reasonableness can be understood as a single model of 
review that captures the structural advantages of this standard, but at the same 
time is capable of facilitating the development of the substantive content of 
socio-economic rights.
We begin our analysis by noting the significant development of 
reasonableness as a standard of review in administrative law and the consequent 
shift towards a more substantive conception of review. In the first part of the 
paper we thus consider the implications of that shift for cases involving review 
of administrative action impacting on socio-economic rights, what we call 
“overlap cases”. One important purpose of this discussion is to show the extent 
to which substantive considerations may enter administrative-law review 
under this ground. This analysis also illustrates the significant development 
of a truly post-constitutional conception of administrative-law review. This 
is a notion of review that breaks with the narrow confines of common-law 
review and embraces an understanding of administrative-law review as part 
of administrative justice within a justiciable bill of rights. We then proceed 
to consider the application of the new reasonableness review model in 
administrative law in overlap cases. These cases raise the issue of overlapping 
standards of review under the banner of reasonableness and consequently the 
relationship between the different provisions regarding this standard.
The second part of the paper examines reasonableness review in socio-
economic rights cases where the cause of action is not formulated in terms of 
administrative law, what we call “non-overlap cases”. This typically concerns 
cases where it is alleged that the legislature or executive branches of government 
have failed to fulfil the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights. In this 
section we examine the problems as well as potential of reasonableness review 
to do justice to the substantive commitments of the socio-economic rights 
provisions in the Constitution.
We conclude by showing that there can be a single model of reasonableness 
review across socio-economic rights and administrative justice cases. While 
the reasonableness standards under the different sections overlap, we argue 
that they do not simply result in duplication, but fulfil different functions in 
the review. Taken together, we conclude that reasonableness offers a model of 
review of socio-economic rights that promotes a number of key constitutional 
objectives. These include transparency and justification of all forms of public 
action, proper consideration of the factual and normative context, and the 
development of the substantive dimensions of the socio-economic rights 
in the Constitution. These we take to be strategic imperatives in realising 
“transformative constitutionalism”10 and a “culture of justification”11 in South 
Africa.
10 Klare (1998) SAJHR 146  
11 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31
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2  The reasonableness review standard in administrative law
2 1  Development of reasonableness as a standard in South African 
administrative law
Reasonableness enjoyed extremely limited status as a ground of review 
of administrative action in South African common law as was the case in 
most common law jurisdictions. As Stratford JA famously stated in Union 
Government:
“There is no authority that I know of ... for the proposition that a court of law will interfere with the 
exercise of a discretion on the mere ground of its unreasonableness.” 12
The court went on to endorse the standard of gross unreasonableness 
as the level at which a court may take notice of unreasonableness upon 
review. As the court subsequently confirmed, proving unreasonableness as 
a ground of review involved “a formidable onus” requiring proof that the 
“decision was grossly unreasonable to so striking a degree as to warrant the 
inference of a failure to apply its mind”.13 Although common-law courts 
were prepared to adopt slightly higher standards of reasonableness review 
for the narrow categories of legislative administrative action (rule-making)14 
and judicial administrative action (tribunal decisions),15 the vast bulk of 
administrative action remained subject only to the excessive standard of 
gross unreasonableness pointing to some other irregularity, aptly labelled 
“symptomatic unreasonableness”.16 This approach was closely aligned to 
the traditional approach to reasonableness in English administrative law that 
came to be known as Wednesbury unreasonableness.17
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“the 
Interim Constitution”) brought a decisive break with the common-law position 
by introducing the right to administrative action that is justifiable in relation 
to the reasons given for it in section 24(d). Despite the (ostensibly deliberate) 
avoidance of the term reasonableness in section 24,18 early responses to 
this right raised the hope that reasonableness had at long last come to South 
African administrative law and with it a substantive dimension to review. A 
number of academic commentators labelled the standard to be adopted under 
section 24(d) as a reasonableness one.19 Early case law expressly recognised 
the substantive dimension of this standard. One of the most significant of these 
early judgments was that of Froneman DJP in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 
12 Union Government (Minister of Mines and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Ltd 1928 
AD 220 236-237
13 National Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 3 SA 726 (A) 735G
14 Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91; R v Abdurahman 1950 3 SA 136 (A)
15 Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in Suid-Afrika 1976 2 SA 1 (A)
16 J Taitz “But ’Twas a Famous Victory” (1978) Acta Juridica 109 111
17 HWR Wade & CF Forsyth Administrative Law 10 ed (2009) 293, 304; Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
18 Mureinik (1994) SAJHR 40 n 34
19 J Klaaren “Administrative Justice” in M Chaskalson, J Kentridge, J Klaaren, G Marcus, D Spitz & S 
Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (RS 5 1999) 25-20; J de Waal, I Currie & G Erasmus 
The Bill of Rights Handbook 3 ed (2000) 473
642 STELL LR 2011 3
       
NO20 where he described section 24(d) as introducing “a requirement of 
rationality in the merit or outcome of the administrative decision” which “goes 
beyond mere procedural impropriety as a ground for review, or irrationality 
only as evidence of procedural impropriety”.21 Despite his reference to 
rationality, Froneman DJP had a substantive standard in mind. This is made 
clear by his important subsequent formulation of what the judicial enquiry 
under this standard entails:
“In determining whether administrative action is justifiable in terms of the reasons given for it, value 
judgments will have to be made which will, almost inevitably, involve the consideration of the ‘merits’ 
of the matter in some way or another. As long as the Judge determining this issue is aware that he or 
she enters the merits not in order to substitute his or her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to 
determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable, the process will be in order.”22
Froneman DJP concluded that the question to ask is whether there is “a 
rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the administrative 
decision-maker between the material properly available to him and the 
conclusion he or she eventually arrived at”.23
Two important points regarding the standard of justifiability flow from 
these remarks. Firstly, the standard applied is not simply a process-orientated 
one, but involves a consideration of the substance or merits of the case, what 
Froneman DJP referred to as “substantive rationality”.24 Under this approach 
the review court does not only consider the way in which the decision was 
reached, that is the reasoning process leading to the decision, but indeed the 
decision itself. The substantive merits of the decision are measured against the 
material put forward, both facts and law, to justify the particular outcome.25 
Secondly, there are strong hints of the variability of the standard to be applied 
ranging from rationality to proportionality in particular cases.
The judgment in Roman v Williams NO26 probably extended the section 
24(d) standard most in this early jurisprudence by noting that it included 
the requirements of “suitability, necessity and proportionality” and that it 
therefore involved “the requirement of proportionality between the means and 
the end”.
The hopes of a truly substantive standard of review were, however, dashed 
by the majority judgment in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, 
Western Cape.27 In that case the majority held that section 2428 had not 
changed the common-law position regarding substantive review and had not 
“introduced substantive fairness into our law as a criterion for judging whether 
20 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC)
21 Para 31
22 Para 36
23 Para 37  
24 Para 37
25 As was stated in Kotzé v Minister of Health 1996 3 BCLR 417 (T) 425 the standard requires that “it must 
appear from the reasons that the action is based on accurate findings of fact and a correct application of 
the law”
26 1998 1 SA 270 (C) 284H-285A
27 2002 3 SA 265 (CC)
28 The case was decided under the transitional reading of s 33 of the Constitution in terms of item 23(2)(b) 
of Sch 6 of the Constitution, which retained s 24 of the Interim Constitution pending the enactment of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”)  
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administrative action is valid or not”.29 The Court noted that such a standard 
would drag judges into policy matters that should, in terms of the separation 
of powers, be left to the political and administrative decision-makers.30 The 
Court also held that Carephone should not be read as suggesting otherwise 
and that the appropriate standard was simply whether there was “a rational 
decision taken lawfully and directed to a proper purpose”.31 The minority 
in stark contrast adopted a highly substantive test, which provided the 
groundwork for the later development of a substantive contextual conception 
of reasonableness under the Constitution and PAJA in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs.32
In their minority judgment Mokgoro and Sachs JJ made a number of 
important remarks regarding the substantive test to be applied under section 
24(d). They expressly endorsed proportionality as a dimension of the standard 
and noted that that includes “an element of substantive review”.33 They held 
that the test to be applied in a given case involves a sliding scale between a 
standard of correctness (whether the correct decision was taken on the merits) 
and a “mere rational connection” standard. In locating the relevant action 
between these extremes the context needs to be taken into account, including 
factors such as “the nature of the right or interest involved; the importance 
of the purpose sought to be achieved by the decision; the nature of the power 
being exercised; the circumstances of its use; the intensity of its impact on 
the liberty, property, livelihood or other rights of the persons affected; the 
broad public interest involved ... [and] whether or not there are manifestly 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”.34 In addition, the minority 
located their substantive review standard within the normative framework 
of the Constitution, which “prohibits administrative action which, however 
meritorious in its general thrust, is based on exclusionary processes, applies 
unacceptable criteria and results in sacrifice being borne in a disproportionate 
and unjustifiable manner, the more so if those who are most adversely affected 
are themselves from a disadvantaged sector of the community”.35 However, 
the minority acknowledged the need to respect the constitutional mandate 
of executive government and the challenges and constraints under which it 
operates and, in particular, the need for courts not to usurp the policy functions 
of the political branches.36 In this regard the minority stated that respect for 
policy-making functions of other state organs must be balanced against the 
need to protect persons seriously affected by administrative decisions.37 In a 
29 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 88
30 Para 88
31 Para 89
32 2004 4 SA 490 (CC)
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striking expression the minority stated that “[t]here are circumstances where 
fairness in implementation must outtop policy”.38
The minority in the final analysis concluded that all these factors led to 
the question whether “the decision can be defended as falling within a wide 
permissible range of discretionary options”.39 In the minority’s view the 
standard of justifiability therefore involved not only a process enquiry into 
the appropriate reasoning method followed to reach the conclusion, but also 
a substantive enquiry in which, taking the substantive context into account, 
the decision falls within the band of outcomes that would be considered 
reasonable by the court.
Against this difference of opinion on what exact standard of review 
justifiability in section 24(d) incorporates, section 33(1) of the Constitution 
adopted the term reasonableness as a standard of administrative justice. Noting 
the clear difference in terminology between the two sections, Chaskalson CJ 
stated in Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd40 that the reasonableness standard under section 33(1) “is a variable but 
higher standard, which in many cases will call for a more intensive scrutiny of 
administrative decisions than would have been competent under the interim 
Constitution”.
In giving effect to section 33 of the Constitution, PAJA contains two clear 
reasonableness grounds of review, namely section 6(2)(f)(ii), the rationality 
standard, and section 6(2)(h), the wording of which is strongly reminiscent 
of the Wednesbury test.41 On its face, section 6(2)(h) involves a very narrow 
standard of reasonableness, something close to the gross unreasonableness 
test of the common law. However, building on the minority judgment in Bel 
Porto, the court in Bato Star rejected gross unreasonableness as an appropriate 
interpretation of section 6(2)(h) under section 33(1) of the Constitution and 
adopted a contextual reasonableness standard under PAJA. It is this standard 
that offers the most potential of a truly substantive test for reasonableness in 
South African administrative law.
2 2  Contextual reasonableness
In Bato Star O’Regan J held that section 6(2)(h) of PAJA should be 
understood as a simple reasonableness test, which asks whether the decision 
is one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach.42 This formulation 
endorses the notion of a band of options and the standard of reasonableness 
simply requiring the relevant decision to fall within that band. O’Regan J 
confirmed the variability of reasonableness, particularly in relation to the 
38 Para 156 with reference to Sedley J in R v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hamble 
(Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714 (QB) 731
39 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 166
40 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 108
41 S 6(2)(h) of PAJA states that administrative action will be reviewable if “the exercise of the power or 
the performance of the function authorised by the empowering provision, in pursuance of which the 
administrative action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so 
exercised the power or performed the function”
42 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 44
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context of the decision and that reasonableness now contains both procedural 
and substantive dimensions.43 She most helpfully provided a list of factors 
that may be taken into account in applying this approach, which includes “the 
nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the 
range of factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, 
the nature of the competing interests involved and the impact of the decision 
on the lives and well-being of those affected”.44 Most of these factors can 
tell us very little about the actual reasonableness of a particular action. The 
factors rather serve to establish the level of scrutiny to be applied in a given 
case, which brings us back to the notion of a sliding scale or continuum of 
reasonableness advanced in the minority judgment in Bel Porto.
The Bato Star approach thus involves a two-stage enquiry, firstly 
establishing what the appropriate level of reasonableness scrutiny must be in 
a given case,45 and secondly, assessing the decision at that level of scrutiny. 
Another way of looking at this approach is that the first step involves setting 
the markers of what would be the band of options available to the reasonable 
decision-maker under the particular circumstances. That involves developing 
some understanding as to what the minimum option would be, but also (at 
least notionally) what the maximum option would be in the given case, that is 
the maximum that a court can insist upon under a review. Once these markers 
have been set, the second step is to determine whether the administrator’s 
choice falls within that band. The key consideration in all of this is the context 
of the particular decision, which includes both the normative context and the 
factual context.
Some of the factors listed by O’Regan J, such as “the nature of the decision” 
(especially where policy is at stake) and “the identity and expertise of the 
decision-maker”, may point towards a lighter rationality type of reasonableness 
analysis. However, other factors such as “the nature of the competing interests 
involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of those 
affected” point to a standard beyond rationality and closer to proportionality, 
involving the consideration of the substantive impact of the decision. The very 
nature of this approach invites a proportionality analysis in which competing 
considerations are balanced.
This approach is a highly substantive one. O’Regan J pointed out that 
key questions are whether the decision taken “will reasonably result in the 
achievement of the goal”, whether the decision is “reasonably supported on 
the facts” and that it is “reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it”.46
The upshot of the contextual reasonableness approach in its most substantive 
dimension (in looking at the merits of the decision) is to define the band 
of decisions that an administrator may take and to check that the decision 
43 Para 45
44 Para 45
45 This is not equivalent to the Canadian model of a certain and fixed number of predetermined levels 
of scrutiny, but a more fluid approach  See M Kidd Following Bato Star: A Guide to Pinpointing 
Reasonableness (2005) unpublished paper presented at the Society of Law Teachers of South Africa 
conference in Bloemfontein, 01-2005 (on file with authors)
46 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 48
646 STELL LR 2011 3
       
made is within those bounds. In “pure” administrative law cases (cases not 
involving other fundamental rights) that involves a fairly broad band of well-
reasoned decisions. However, the variability of the standard allows for the 
band to be narrowed where the context demands. Thus, in a particular context, 
typically involving a decision with a high policy dimension and insignificant 
impact, the appropriate standard may be rationality, which denotes a very 
wide band of options only requiring some substantive basis supporting the 
outcome. In other cases, primarily where a decision has a severe impact and/
or an impact on fundamental rights, a much stricter proportionality inquiry 
will be appropriate, which significantly narrows that band of options. The 
information must show that the decision arrived at was narrowly tailored 
to reach the desired outcome with minimal adverse impact and that there is 
evidence of a weighing of the negative and positive of the decision with an 
eventual balancing in the final outcome. In this approach the context will 
expand or narrow the band of options open to an administrator that will be 
considered reasonable.
2 3  Normative context
An important dimension of the context that informs the contextual 
reasonableness approach is the normative context. This refers to the relevance 
of the Constitution in general, in particular other fundamental rights, to the 
administrative decision at hand. The constitutional normative context plays 
a pivotal role in applying the contextual reasonableness approach in specific 
cases. In particular, it may result in a significant narrowing down of the band 
of options.
Bato Star itself provides one of the best examples of this role of the 
constitutional normative context. In the second majority judgment, Ngcobo J 
approached the review of the action at stake from a completely different angle 
than that of O’Regan J. His focus in determining whether the administrator’s 
decision was reviewable under the circumstances was to assess the substantive 
goals to be achieved by the decision, in this case transformation of the fishing 
industry, and the administrator’s substantive choice within the constitutional 
framework, particularly “the place of transformation in our constitutional 
democracy”.47 This approach led Ngcobo J to conclude that where the 
empowering provision required the administrator to “have regard to” a 
number of policy objectives, one of which was transformation of the industry, 
the band of options open to the administrator was significantly narrowed 
by the constitutional imperative of transformation. Given the importance of 
transformation in the normative context, options which simply “bear in mind” 
or do not overlook transformation were not open to the administrator. Instead, 
the administrator had to pick an option that actively promoted transformation. 
While Ngcobo J based his reasoning on a basic lawfulness premise, focusing 
on compliance with the empowering provision, rather than a reasonable basis, 
47 Para 71
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his approach is a good example of the role that the normative context can play 
in narrowing the band of substantive choices open to an administrator.
The role of the normative context will be particularly important where other 
fundamental rights are at stake, such as socio-economic rights. In such cases, 
the substantive dimension of those rights impact directly on adjudicating the 
substance of the administrative action in terms of the contextual reasonableness 
approach. It is to these cases that we now turn.
2 4  The reasonableness of administrative action impacting on socio-
economic rights
Applying the contextual reasonableness approach outlined above to cases 
where administrative action impacts on socio-economic rights requires the 
relevant socio-economic right to inform the normative context of the analysis. 
Put differently, when taking administrative action that affects socio-economic 
rights the band of substantive choices open to the reasonable administrator is 
narrowed to those options that conform to the substantive commitments of the 
relevant right. The implication is that a court should determine the substantive 
content of the relevant socio-economic right when testing for reasonableness 
under section 33 of the Constitution.
Two distinctive features of review in overlap cases can accordingly be 
identified. Firstly, the purpose of the measures required in terms of sections 
26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution should be provided by the normative goals 
underpinning the rights enshrined in sections 26(1) and 27(1). The explicit 
formulation of these provisions is that everyone should have access to the 
“adequate”, “sufficient” or “appropriate” level of housing, health care, food, 
water and social security.48 As human rights, socio-economic rights seek to 
promote and advance the fundamental values of this tradition, namely human 
dignity, equality and freedom.49 They should also be interpreted according to 
the courts’ core interpretive mandate in section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution to 
interpret the Bill of Rights so as to “promote the values that underlie an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. This 
provision requires the Court to develop a substantive and transparent account 
of the normative purposes and goals which the relevant rights should seek to 
advance. Developing the substantive content of socio-economic rights will 
require close attention to the relevant historical, social, economic and cultural 
meanings and experiential dimensions of the rights in the South African context 
as well as dialogic engagement with relevant international and comparative 
law standards and jurisprudence. This openness to considering developments 
in international law and other jurisdictions is expressly mandated in section 
39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution.
48 It is noteworthy that there is no adjective qualifying health care or social security, but arguably a 
qualitative dimension is intrinsic to nature of rights  This would certainly accord with international law 
standards (see, for example, United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
“UN CESCR”) General Comment No 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art.12) 
(2000) UN Doc E/C 12/2000/4 and UN CESCR General Comment No 19: The Right to Social Security 
(art. 9) (2007) UN Doc E/C 12/GC/19
49 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 97-101
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The substantive goals provided by the rights in sections 26(1) and 27(1) 
of the Constitution narrow the band of permissible policy choices. It is not 
enough that the objectives which the State sets itself fall within the broad 
range of what are regarded as “legitimate” State objectives. These objectives 
must be consistent with the normative purposes of the rights. This implies 
a rights-conscious social policy, planning and budgeting process. It is 
noteworthy in this context that one of the core obligations identified by the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
“CESCR”) in relation to the rights protected in the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (the “ICESCR”)50 is the 
adoption of national strategy and plan of action aimed at the realisation of the 
relevant rights. Such a national plan must be participatory and transparent and 
set clear goals as well as indicators and benchmarks by which progress can 
be monitored. Particular attention must be given in the plan to vulnerable or 
marginalised groups.51
The second feature which should distinguish overlap cases from non-
overlap cases concerns the relationship between the measures adopted and 
the constitutionally mandated goal. The State is obliged to take positive 
measures towards the realisation and protection of the relevant rights.52 It may 
not remain purely passive when there are people within its jurisdiction lacking 
access to the relevant rights. In comparison, in non-overlap cases passivity 
would be an option as the State is not obliged to adopt positive measures. 
Passivity regarding a particular non-socio-economic rights substantive matter, 
say building roads, may pass the reasonableness test if the State can justify 
its choice to do nothing, for example with reference to competing substantive 
priorities, say improving rail connections. In the context of socio-economic 
rights, however, a positive duty to “realise” or “fulfil” the relevant rights implies 
scrutiny of whether the measures adopted are reasonably capable of fulfilling 
this objective. As O’Regan J pointed out in Bato Star, reasonableness means 
asking inter alia whether the decision taken “will reasonably result in the 
achievement of the goal”.53 In the absence of this linkage, the measures adopted 
are abstracted from the normative goal set in terms of sections 26(1) and 27(1) 
of ensuring that everyone has access to the relevant rights to the requisite 
standard of sufficiency.54 In many circumstances, the State will have a range 
of options to choose from, but subject always to the need to justify through the 
presentation of evidence and argument that the measures chosen are capable 
of advancing the constitutionally mandated goals. In other circumstances, the 
50 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316
51 See, for example, UN CESCR General Comment No 14 (2000) para 43 (f); UN CESCR General Comment 
No 15: The Right to Water (arts. 11 & 12) (2002) UN Doc E/C 12/2002/11 para 37(f) and paras 46-54
52 This is clear from the formulation of ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution, read with the overarching duty 
of the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the Bill of Rights in terms of s 7(2)  For 
an application of the latter set of duties to the right to basic education, see Governing Body of the Juma 
Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC)
53 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 48
54 See, for example, M Pieterse “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” 
(2004) 20 SAJHR 383 410-411; D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and 
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007) 159-162  
REASONABLENESS REVIEW 649
       
context may indicate that the “choice of means” available to the State to give 
effect to the relevant rights is much narrower.55 The narrowing of the band, 
and in particular the extent of the narrowing, thus depends on the substantive 
implications of the relevant right. In terms of the Bato Star approach to 
reasonableness the determination of this narrowing, by understanding what 
the substantive implications of the relevant right are under the circumstances, 
is a first step to assess the reasonableness of the administrator’s substantive 
choice. In overlap cases the reasonableness analysis therefore requires more 
than simply indicating that the eventual choice was a properly reasoned one.
A rights-based analysis would furthermore imply a proportionality inquiry 
in assessing whether the means adopted are reasonably capable of advancing 
the normative goals and purposes of the relevant socio-economic rights. As 
noted above, this would entail inquiries into the extent of the impact on the 
relevant right, whether there are measures less restrictive or invasive of the 
rights which could be taken, and whether the State’s justifications for not 
providing the service in question outweigh the impact of the deprivation on the 
claimant. This approach largely resembles the inquiry followed in respect of 
the general limitations clause and incorporates many of the factors identified 
by O’Regan J in Bato Star as relevant in determining the reasonableness of 
administrative decisions.56
How does this approach gel with the drafting of sections 26 and 27, 
specifically the qualifying phrases of “reasonableness”, “within available 
resources” and “progressive realisation” found in their second subsections? 
Sections 26(1) and 27(1) consists of an initial assertion of the rights to which 
everyone are entitled, followed by a second subsection which describes the 
nature of the duty resting on the State in relation to the realisation of the rights 
specified in the first subsection. The first two subsections are separated into 
two distinct, but interrelated provisions. This formulation clearly implies that 
the right cannot simply be reduced to an obligation of the State to behave 
reasonably in the broad sphere of social policy. Such a reading would amount, 
in Danie Brand’s words, to no more than an injunction for the State to observe 
“structural principles of good governance” in relation to socio-economic 
rights.57 Rather, the obligation on the State to take reasonable measures refers 
to a very specific objective, namely, “the realisation” of the rights specified in 
sections 26(1) and 27(1). The reasonableness of the State’s acts and omissions 
must thus be assessed in relation to the achievement of this constitutionally-
specified goal. In Khosa v Minister of Social Development,58 the Court 
explicitly distinguished the “relatively low” test for rationality review from the 
standard of reasonableness review in the context of socio-economic rights.
55 An example of such a situation would be the facts and circumstances of Minister of Health v Treatment 
Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC)  But even then, the Court explicitly granted government the 
latitude to adapt its policy “if equally better methods become available to it for the prevention of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV” (para 135, Order para 4)
56 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 45
57 Brand “Proceduralisation” in Rights and Democracy 53  
58 2004 6 SA 505 (CC)
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Certainly, the concept of reasonableness in itself implies a measure of the 
flexibility regarding the precise means to be adopted to achieve the goals, but 
this flexibility does not absolve a court from interrogating whether the means 
chosen are reasonably likely to advance the achievement of the goal, that is falls 
within the band of reasonable options.59 Given the fact that the inquiry centres 
on the protection of rights in the Bill of Rights, “strong-form” reasonableness 
is appropriate which incorporates a proportionality inquiry. The narrowing 
of the band of options resulting from such “strong form” reasonableness 
review does not, however, exclude innovative approaches to the realisation 
of rights. By the narrowing of the band we do not propose that the court will 
exhaustively formulate the actual measures that a reasonable administrator 
may take. Within the defined markers that set the band in a given case there 
should be ample scope for experimentation with different measures to realise 
the right. The concepts of “available resources” and “progressive realisation” 
in sections 26(2) and 27(2) represent specific considerations within the overall 
reasonableness inquiry which a court must give weight to in assessing the 
State’s justificatory arguments in opting for a particular measure. However, 
while resource constraints and “progressive realisation” may constitute a 
basis for justifying the State’s lack of progress in advancing access to socio-
economic rights, these factors also set standards of accountability within 
the reasonableness inquiry. Thus the CESCR has held that the concept of 
“progressive realisation” in article 2 of the Covenant is, on the one hand, a 
“necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the 
difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights”. On the other hand, the UN CESCR states:
“[T]he phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the 
Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realization 
of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards that goal.”60
Similarly, a failure to use available resources optimally (such as under-
expenditure of allocated budgets) or efficiently (such as wasteful expenditure) 
59 The ICESCR uses the phrase “by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures” in art 2  This is the equivalent of the concept of “reasonable legislative and other measures” 
used in ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the South African Constitution  In relation to the obligation “to adopt all 
appropriate means” in the Covenant, the CESCR has commented as follows in relation to the supervision 
of State’s obligations in the periodic reporting process:
“While each State party must decide for itself which means are the most appropriate under the 
circumstances with respect to each of the rights, the ‘appropriateness’ of the means chosen will 
not always be self-evident  It is therefore desirable that State parties’ reports should indicate not 
only the measures that have been taken but also the basis on which they are considered to be the 
most ‘appropriate’ under the circumstances  However, the ultimate determination as to whether all 
appropriate measures have been taken remains one for the Committee to make ” (UN CESCR General 
Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (art 2(1)) (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 para 4)
It is noteworthy that in the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/117 establishing an individual communications procedure, the 
examination (or “review” standard set in art 8(4)) is “the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State 
Party”  
60 UN CESCR General Comment No 3 para 9 (cited with approval in Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 45)
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should be strong indicators of unreasonableness in the context of socio-
economic rights adjudication.
Reasonableness review described above is both a normative and context-
sensitive standard. It is normative in the sense that the purposes and 
proportionality of the State’s measures are assessed in relation to the overall 
objective to ensure the realisation of the relevant socio-economic rights. It is 
context-sensitive in the sense that this inquiry requires close attention to the 
factual context of relevant cases, how the deprivation in question impacts on 
the particular claimant group and the factual basis of the State’s justifications 
for its conduct. Where the impact of the State’s acts or omissions on socio-
economic rights is severe, the review standard is correspondingly tightened 
(or narrowed). Much weightier justifications are required from the State to 
justify its actions or inaction, as the case may be. This was acknowledged by 
the Court in the context of reviewing the State’s compliance with its positive 
duties to ensure the safety and security of persons using commuter trains. 
It held that the assessment of reasonableness should include, among other 
factors, “the extent of any threat to fundamental rights should the duty not be 
met as well as the intensity of any harm that may result”.61 O’Regan J went 
on to hold, “[t]he more grave is the threat to fundamental rights, the greater is 
the responsibility on the duty bearer”.62
The potential of the contextual reasonableness approach of Bato Star has, 
however, not been fully exploited. The actual application of the approach in 
both judgments in Bato Star was fairly weak. Both applied little more that 
thin rationality, mostly by accepting the say-so of the administrator and being 
satisfied that attention had been given to the transformative objectives at 
issue in taking the decision.63 There is very little interrogation of the actual 
substantive outcome of the decision, that is, to assess how the administrator’s 
choice will in substance advance transformation. In this sense both judgments 
seem much closer to the test advocated in Bel Porto where any link between 
objective and decision will do, regardless of how tenuous that link may be in 
substance.
3  The reasonableness standard in socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence
In this part, we consider the model of review applied to socio-economic 
rights cases where the primary breach is identified as arising from executive 
or legislative acts or omissions. In other words, the impugned conduct does 
not constitute administrative action falling within the scope of section 33 
of the Constitution and PAJA. Here we focus primarily on cases in which it 
is argued that the presence or absence of legislation, social programmes or 
policies infringe the obligations imposed bysections 26, 27, 28(1)(c) and 29 of 
the Constitution.
61 Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 88
62 Para 88
63 See Davis (2006) Acta Juridica 23  
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We commence by tracing the developments in the socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence concerning cases where it is alleged that the State has failed 
to comply with an aspect of the positive duties imposed by sections 26(1) 
and 27(1) read with their second subsections. To place the discussion of this 
category of cases in context we provide a brief overview of the structure of the 
review model applied respectively to the negative and positive duties imposed 
by the socio-economic rights, and thereafter to the rights formulated as 
qualified and unqualified entitlements. Our overall objectives in this part are 
twofold. First, we seek to examine to what extent the courts have developed a 
model of review in socio-economic rights jurisprudence which is distinct from 
a more formalistic model of administrative-law model of review. Second, we 
examine how the more substantive reasonableness review criteria formulated 
in the context of South African administrative law (discussed in the previous 
part) can contribute to the development of principled, transparent criteria for 
reviewing socio-economic rights claims.
3 1  The model of review applied to different types of socio-economic 
rights claims
Before proceeding to assess the model of review applied to positive socio-
economic rights claims in the light of this understanding of the appropriate 
method of review, it is useful to situate this analysis within a broad overview 
of the structure of review applied to different types of socio-economic rights 
claims. The first noteworthy feature of the jurisprudence is that the Court 
has drawn a categorical distinction between the model of review applied to 
negative and positive duties, respectively. Thus where state action is held to 
deprive people of the existing access that they enjoy to socio-economic rights, 
this is held to constitute a prima facie breach of the negative duty “to respect” 
the relevant rights which the Court has located in sections 26(1) and 27(1).64 
The State’s justifications for the infringement are assessed according to the 
stringent purpose and proportionality requirements of the general limitations 
clause.65 This is consonant with the traditional two-stage approach to 
constitutional review applied in respect of most other rights in the Bill of 
Rights.
In contrast, when the alleged infringement is classified as a breach of the 
positive duties in respect of socio-economic rights (which the court locates in 
sections 26(2) and 27(2)), a different model of review is applied. The Court 
has expressly held that the positive duties to achieve the realisation of socio-
economic rights for those who lack access to socio-economic rights, or whose 
current access is inadequate, is both defined and limited by the criteria of 
64 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34; Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 46, Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen 
v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) paras 33-34; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 
2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC)
65 S 36 of the Constitution
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reasonableness, progressive realisation and the State’s available resources.66 
In adopting the reasonableness standard of constitutional review, the Court 
has eschewed a relatively more absolutist model based on a minimum core 
approach.
3 2  The development of reasonableness review in the jurisprudence
In the first socio-economic rights case to come before the Constitutional 
Court, Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal,67 the Court focused 
its inquiry on whether the justifications provided by the State for rejecting 
the applicant for kidney dialysis treatment at a state hospital were fair and 
reasonable. Applying a costs-benefits analysis the Court held that the rationing 
criteria for kidney dialysis were designed to allow more people to benefit 
from scarce kidney dialysis facilities than would be the case in the absence of 
such criteria.68 Devoting further resources to the kidney dialysis programme 
would prejudice both other health-related expenditure (including on primary 
health care), and the other legitimate needs which the State is required to 
meet.69 In Soobramoney minimal attention was paid to the distinctive feature 
of the normative goals and purposes of the right of access to “health care 
services” in section 27(1)(a) read with 27(2). In contrast, greater attention was 
paid to the scope of section 27(3) (the right to emergency medical treatment), 
including at least some comparative references to Indian jurisprudence.70 The 
justificatory analysis is thus conducted without reference to the critical first 
step of reasonableness review described by Sadurski – determining the nature 
of the decision to be taken, and assessing its normative importance.
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom71 signalled the 
evolution of a more clearly articulated model of review in respect of positive 
socio-economic rights claims. The Court indicated that it would adopt, as 
described by Danie Brand, the “means-end” justificatory model characteristic 
of reasonableness review.72 Thus it held in the context of the right of access 
to adequate housing that measures must be adopted that
“establish a coherent public housing programme directed towards the progressive realisation of the 
right of access to adequate housing within the State’s available means. The programme must be 
capable of facilitating the realisation of the right. The precise contours and content of the measures 
66 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 11; Minister of Health 
v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 30-39  For a critique of the different 
models of review applied in respect of negative and positive duties, see S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the 
Seduction of the Negative/Positive Duties Dichotomy” (2011) 26 SAPL 38-59
67 1998 1 SA 765 (CC)
68 Paras 25-26
69 Para 28
70 Paras 12-21  For criticisms of the restrictive, and purely “negative duties” meaning given to s 27(3), see 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 137-139; C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities 
in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 
SAJHR 206 245-248
71 2001 1 SA 46 (CC)
72 Brand “Proceduralisation” in Rights and Democracy 40
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to be adopted are primarily a matter for the legislature and the executive. They must, however, ensure 
that the measures they adopt are reasonable.”73
This is strongly suggestive of a proportionality approach. Government is 
allowed a margin of discretion relating to the specific policy choices – or band 
of options – it is free to choose from in giving effect to socio-economic rights.74 
However, the court is required to inquire whether such measures constitute 
a reasonable response to the socio-economic deprivation in question taking 
into account the constitutionally mandated goal in section 26(1) and 26(2) of 
ensuring that everyone has access to an adequate level of the relevant social 
services and resources.75 Reasonableness must be assessed in the light of the 
normative goals that the relevant socio-economic rights seek to advance.76
The Court devoted attention to developing some of the substantive features 
of housing as a human right and how it contributes to the promotion of 
foundational constitutional values as well as other rights in the Bill of Rights. 
Thus yacoob J held that housing “entails more than bricks and mortar”.77 
He goes on to refer in this context to land, various services (such as water 
and sewage removal) as well as the physical structure. Moreover, the Court 
highlights some of the broader constitutional objectives that housing as human 
right is designed to foster such as enabling people to enjoy the other rights in 
the Bill of Rights, the advancement of racial and gender equality and “the 
evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve 
their full potential”.78 Human dignity is the value-based underpinning of the 
Court’s key finding in Grootboom that reasonableness requires as a minimum 
or basic step short-term measures of relief for those whose needs are urgent 
and “who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations”.79 Thus a 
statistical improvement in housing delivery will not pass the reasonableness 
test if it is not appropriately attuned and responsive to the circumstances of 
those in desperate need.80
The Court also explicitly engages with international law in its judgment, 
specifically the ICESCR. While not endorsing the direct application of 
a minimum core approach81 (outside the framework of reasonableness 
73 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41 (emphasis added)  
The overarching requirement that a reasonable programme in the context of socio-economic rights must 
be geared towards the realisation of the relevant right is also implicit in the further criteria for assessing 
the reasonableness of the programme referred to in Grootboom: the programme must be comprehensive, 
coherent, co-ordinated (paras 39-40, 95); appropriate financial and human resources have must be 
allocated to it (paras 39, 68); and the programme must be balanced and flexible, making appropriate 
provision for short-, medium- and long-term needs (para 43)
74 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41  See also Rail 
Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 87  
75 Frank Michelman describes the objectives of socio-economic rights to be the creation of “legal obligations 
on lawmakers to make their best effort to devise, adopt and execute policies and measures that will result 
in the desired social-outcome targets ” F Michelman “Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: 
Explaining America Away” (2008) 6 I CON 663 667-668




79 Paras 63-64, 99
80 Para 44 (“[T]he Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern”)
81 Paras 26-33
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review),82 it did, as noted above, endorse the CESCR’s interpretation of the 
concept of “progressive realisation” in General Comment No 3.83
Reasonableness will be assessed in the light of the relevant social, 
economic and historical context, the capacity of institutions responsible for 
implementing the programme,84 and allowance must be for the availability of 
resources and the latitude of progressive realisation. Nevertheless, the overall 
inquiry remains whether the impugned measures are sufficiently effective 
and expeditious in achieving the goal of the full realisation of the relevant 
socio-economic rights. The more serious the socio-economic deprivation 
and its consequences, the proportionately greater the response expected from 
relevant organs of State.
In Grootboom, Khosa, Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 
2)85 and the recent eviction-related jurisprudence,86 a number of open-ended, 
non-exhaustive indicators87 of the reasonableness of the measures adopted 
by the State have been developed. These include: reasonable formulation 
and implementation of programmes;88 transparency;89 non-discrimination 
against groups in their access to relevant programmes;90 the impact of 
the deprivation on other rights such as life, dignity and equality91; and 
“meaningful engagement” with affected groups.92 Most of these indicators 
express aspects of the central constitutional values of human dignity, non-
discrimination, transparency, and participatory democracy.93
82 Note specifically the possibility left open by the Court that “[t]here may be cases where it may be possible 
and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core obligation to determine whether the 
measures taken by the State are reasonable” (Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 33)  See also Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 
721 (CC) para 34  
83 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 45  See also UN 
CESCR General Comment No 3 (2000) para 9 on the CESCR’s interpretation of the concept of progressive 
realisation
84 Para 43
85 2002 5 SA 721 (CC)
86 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC); Residents of 
Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC); Abahlali BaseMondolo 
Movement SA v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 2010 2 BCLR 99 (CC); City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA)  
87 The Court noted in Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 
2004 6 SA 505 (CC) that the factors identified in the assessment of reasonableness were not a closed list 
and that “all relevant factors have to be taken into account”  The Court went on to observe that “[w]hat is 
relevant may vary from case to case depending on the particular facts and circumstances” (para 44)
88 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 40-43
89 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 123
90 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 
(CC)
91 Para 44
92 See the eviction cases listed in n 83 above and Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v 
Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC)
93 Carol Steinberg argues that it is the heavier weighting of the values of human dignity and equality and 
the closer scrutiny of whether government programmes have been sufficiently attentive to these values 
that distinguishes reasonableness review in the context of socio-economic rights jurisprudence from an 
administrative law model of review where constitutional rights are not implicated  C Steinberg “Can 
Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” 
(2006) 123 SALJ 264 277, 281
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While in Khosa there is some attempt to articulate the goals and values of 
social security as a human right,94 very little explicit attempt is made by the Court 
in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign to articulate the normative 
content of the right of access to health care services in section 27(1). The case 
is resolved in favour of the claimants primarily on the basis of reviewing the 
rationality of the arguments put forward by Government in favour of its restrictive 
and inflexible approach to the provision of Nevirapine throughout the public 
health sector to reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV in childbirth.95 
This is not far removed from the ground of review in administrative law that the 
decision is not rationally connected to the reasons given for it.96
3 3  Reasonableness review in Mazibuko
The leading recent case on the review of positive duties in the context 
of socio-economic rights claims is Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg.97 We 
focus here on the first leg of the claim which concerned the sufficiency of the 
City of Johannesburg’s policy relating to the quantum of a free basic water 
supply, although both legs of the claim are closely related.98 In particular, the 
Court was requested to consider whether the decision by the City to limit its 
supply of free basic water to six kilolitres of free water per month to every 
accountholder in the city was in conflict with the right of access to “sufficient” 
water in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution read with subsection (2), or with 
section 11 of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997.
In its judgment, the Court gave a narrow construction of the “reasonableness 
review” standard for assessing the positive duties imposed by socio-economic 
rights as developed in the Grootboom, TAC and Khosa cases.99 The Court 
justified its deferential stance by reference to institutional concerns regarding 
the “proper role” of courts vis-á-vis the other branches of government. Thus 
O’Regan J stated:
“[O]rdinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what the achievement 
of any particular social and economic right entails and what steps government should take to ensure 
progressive realisation of the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, 
the institutions of government best placed to investigate social conditions in the light of available 
94 See, for example, Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 
2004 6 SA 505 (CC) paras 74, 76-77, 79-81
95 See also Brand “Proceduralisation” in Rights and Democracy 50-51; Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental 
Rights 152-162  
96 See s 6(2)(f)(ii)(dd) of PAJA  In rebutting the rationality of the State’s justifications, the Court accorded 
significant weight to the excellent medical evidence marshaled by the Treatment Action Campaign as well 
as the opinions of international and local expert bodies in the field such as the World Health Organisation 
and the Medicines Control Council  This arguably infuses a more substantive dimension in the degree of 
scrutiny applied in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) than a 
mere Wednesbury review standard  
97 2010 4 SA 1 (CC)
98 For a critique of the reasoning adopted by the Court in relation to the second leg of the claim relating to 
the installation of pre-paid water meters, see G Quinot “Substantive Reasoning in Administrative-Law 
Adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 124-136
99 For criticisms of the narrow construction and application of the reasonableness review standard adopted 
in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC), see Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 468-472; 
L Williams “The Role of the Courts in the Quantitative Implementation of Social and Economic Rights: 
A Comparative Study” (2010) 3 CCR 141
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budgets and to determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic rights. Indeed, 
it is desirable as a matter of democratic accountability that they should do so for it is their programmes 
and promises that are subjected to democratic popular choice.”100
She went on to hold that the Court’s role in enforcing the positive duties 
imposed by socio-economic rights is restricted to two primary scenarios. 
First, if government does not take steps to realise socio-economic rights, 
“the courts will require the government to take steps”.101 Second, the courts 
will intervene if the measures adopted by government “fail to meet the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness”.102 Three basic situations would 
be indicative of unreasonableness: a) where no provision is made for those 
most desperately in need;103 b) socio-economic policies contain unjustifiable 
exclusions or restrictions;104 and c) a failure by government “continually to 
review its policies to ensure that the achievement of the right is progressively 
realised”.105
Applying these criteria the Court found that it had not been shown that the 
refusal of the City of Johannesburg to provide more than the basic minimum 
water supply of 25 litres per person per day (or six kilolitres per household 
per month) prescribed in Regulation 3(b) of the National Water Standards 
Regulations106 to the Water Services Act to the households in Phiri was 
unreasonable. Persuasive facts for the Court appears to have been that at 
least some basic water was being provided, that there were others who were 
“worse off” than the Phiri community,107 there was provision for flexibility 
in the programme through the additional water available through the City 
of Johannesburg’s indigency policy,108 and it would be “administratively 
extremely burdensome and costly, if possible at all”109 to provide water to 
households in Phiri on a per person universal basis instead of the set allowance 
of six kilolitres per month per household basis (based the assumption of 25 
litres per person per day in a household of eight persons).110 It was argued 
that this resulted in an insufficient supply of water to larger households, 
particularly in the light of the fact that with the acute housing shortage in 
the townships stands were frequently occupied by more than one household 
resulting in some stands, such as Ms Mazibuko’s, accommodating as many as 
100 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 61
101 Para 67
102 Para 67
103 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC)
104 The Court cites its judgment in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 
721 (CC) as an example of a programme in which the Court simply ordered government to remove an 
“unreasonable limitation or exclusion”  For criticism of this reading of the basis for the Minister of Health 
v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) decision, see Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 469
105 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 67
106 Regulations relating to compulsory national standards and measures to conserve water, GN R 509 in GG 
22355 of 08-06-2001
107 The Court referred to the fact that, according to Statistics South Africa Census 2001 (2001), approximately 
a tenth of all households within the jurisdiction of the City of Johannesburg have no access to a tap 




110 Paras 84, 86-89
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three families (20 people). In the end the Court refrained from engaging with 
the arguments regarding the sufficiency of the 25 litres per person per day 
basic water supply despite acknowledging at the outset of its judgment that, 
“[w]ater is life” and that
“[h]uman beings need water to drink, to cook, to wash and to grow our food. Without it, we will 
die.”111
The considerations referred to above which carried weight in the Court’s 
judgment should undoubtedly form part of the proportionality analysis in a case 
such as Mazibuko. However, these justifications are weighed without a prior 
rigorous analysis of the nature of the right at issue and the impact of the basic 
water allowance on households in the circumstances of Ms Mazibuko.112 The 
result is that there is no narrowing of the bands of purpose and proportionality 
which should occur in judicial review where fundamental rights are at stake. 
Judicial review in Mazibuko accordingly has more in common with “weak 
form” rationality review than “strong form” reasonableness review.
Paradoxically, if one were to assume that the action at stake in Mazibuko 
qualified as administrative action,113 the Bato Star test for reasonableness 
may have resulted in much closer scrutiny of the context than was actually 
done in that judgment solely in terms of section 27. Especially the last two 
factors listed by O’Regan J in Bato Star, namely “the nature of the competing 
interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being 
of those affected”,114 may have invited a closer look at both the decisions 
regarding the quantum of a free basic water supply and the installation of pre-
payment meters against the substantive entitlements of section 27 and the real 
impact on the people of Phiri. Since the well-reasoned and rational decision-
making dimension of the analysis would have been done in terms of section 
33(1), the focus on section 27 could have remained entirely substantive. This 
indicates how the interaction of reasonableness under administrative justice 
and socio-economic rights in overlap cases can force a review court into truly 
substantive engagement with both socio-economic rights and administrative 
action. It also illustrates how the combination of the different provisions in a 
single model of reasonableness review can avoid a proceduralisation of socio-
economic rights by locating that dimension of the review in section 33.
3 4  The relationship between the “internal” reasonableness test in 
sections 26 and 27 and the general limitations clause
The proportionality inquiry that we have put forward in reviewing socio-
economic rights claims is identical to the justification inquiry normally 
taking place in terms of section 36. The potential overlap between the internal 
“reasonableness” inquiry in sections 26 (2) and 27(2) and the reasonableness 
111 Para 1
112 See the more detailed engagement with these elements in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgments in Mazibuko: Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2008 4 All SA 471 (W); City of Johannesburg 
v Mazibuko 2009 3 SA 592 (SCA)
113 This is not a particularly big assumption, see Quinot (2010) 3 CCR 135-136
114 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 45
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inquiry in the general limitations clause (section 36) was recognised by the 
Court in Khosa.115 However, Mokgoro J did not decide whether a different 
threshold of reasonableness should be applied in section 36. She held that 
even if a different test should be applied, she was satisfied that the exclusion 
of permanent residents from the relevant social assistance scheme would 
not meet the criteria for reasonableness and justifiability in terms of section 
36.116
As argued above, sections 26(2) and 27(2) both define the nature of the 
State’s obligations in relation to the rights in sections 26(1) and 27(1), and 
permit the State to raise specific justificatory factors such as resource 
constraints and the latitude of “progressive realisation”. “Reasonableness” in 
the second subsection can in fact incorporate the proportionality inquiry of 
section 36, making section 36 largely redundant in this context except for 
the threshold requirement that a limitation of rights must be in terms of a 
law of general application. However, the strategic danger of subsuming the 
limitations inquiry into the rights definitional stage of the inquiry is that the 
traditional two stage-methodology of constitutional analysis is blurred. This 
can lead to a lack of principled, focused attention on the scope and purposes 
of the relevant socio-economic right, before turning to consider the State’s 
justificatory arguments.117 As noted above, crucial to a proper application of 
the proportionality requirement is a clear understanding of the nature of the 
right affected,118 and the impact of the challenged conduct or omissions on the 
normative purposes and values which the relevant right seeks to promote.119
The two-stage approach and an explicit consideration of the factors to 
be considered under the general limitations clause promotes transparency 
in identifying and weighing the relevant considerations underpinning the 
ultimate decision of the Court. If the trend is to continue whereby the internal 
reasonableness standard in sections 26(2) and 27(2) is to do the heavy lifting 
of definition and limitation, then the Court should at least separate out the 
different strands of the reasoning process and commence with an initial 
principled consideration of the relevant right asserted in sections 26(1) and 
27(1), and the impact of the impugned conduct on the values and purposes 
promoted by the relevant right. The focus at this stage is on the right and 
rights-holder. Proper attention to this inquiry provides the normative and 
contextual framework for proceeding to apply a proportionality analysis to 
the State’s arguments that its conduct meets the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness. This is the same approach that we have put forward for the 
115 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) 
para 83
116 Para 84  Compare the minority judgment of Ngcobo J (as he then was)  See I Rautenbach “The Right to 
Access to Sufficient Water and the Two Stage Approach to the Application of the Bill of Rights” (2011) 74 
THRHR 107 117-119 for an analysis of the different constructions of the relationship between ss 26 and 27 
and the general limitations clause
117 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 201-202
118 This is the first factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness and justifiability of limitations to 
rights in terms of s 36 (s 36(1)(a))
119 This corresponds with the third factor in the general limitation clause which requires consideration of the 
“nature and extent of the limitation” (s 36(1)(c))
660 STELL LR 2011 3
       
interaction between section 33 and socio-economic rights in overlap cases 
above. This will not only foster transparency in the judicial reasoning process 
in socio-economic rights claims, but will also ensure that reasonableness in 
the context of socio-economic rights adjudication is appropriately attuned to 
the normative considerations of human rights claims.
4  Conclusion
Our analysis above indicates that there can be a unified model of 
reasonableness review across cases involving administrative and non-
administrative measures impacting on socio-economic rights. The various 
reasonableness standards found in distinct provisions of the Bill of Rights 
are capable of being interpreted in a way that promotes a coherent model of 
review. In terms of this model, reasonableness under the various provisions 
overlap, but do not duplicate the same function. There is rather an interaction 
between these standards that promote the core advantages of reasonableness 
as a model of review.
In administrative law, the best model for reasonableness review flows from 
the judgments in Bato Star. In terms of this model, reasonableness review is 
a contextual inquiry with the level of scrutiny being determined by a number 
of factors focusing on the context of the relevant case. This context involves 
both the normative context and the factual context. The former refers to the 
other constitutional provisions implicated in the case. The model allows the 
court to engage with the substance of the administrative decision at stake, but 
not in order to assess whether the correct decision was taken on the merits, but 
whether the decision falls within a band of reasonable decisions on the merits. 
The normative context plays a critical role in defining that band of options. 
In cases where administrative action impacts on socio-economic rights (what 
we call overlap cases) the substantive entitlements found in the relevant socio-
economic right determines to a large extent the scope of the band of options 
available to the administrator. In effect, in overlap cases, the band is narrowed 
with reference to the substance of the relevant socio-economic right.
In cases involving measures impacting on socio-economic rights that are 
not administrative action, mostly executive or legislative measures (what we 
call non-overlap cases), the model of review is necessarily different from the 
one in overlap cases. In these cases, the Constitutional Court applies a different 
model of review depending on whether the case is classified as a breach of a 
negative duty imposed by the relevant socio-economic right, or a breach of a 
positive duty. In the former type of case the court assesses the justificatory 
analysis of the infringing measures within the strict proportionality analysis 
of the limitations clause. However, in the latter type of case the court subsumes 
all aspects of the reasonableness analysis within the relevant right. The effect, 
particularly in the context of cases involving the review of positive duties, 
is that very little attention is given to the substantive content of the relevant 
socio-economic right. All the work is done in the justificatory analysis.
Under the model we advocate here, a distinct role is given to reasonableness 
analysis in terms of the relevant socio-economic right as a first step of the 
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model. This first step involves giving content to the relevant right in all 
types of cases before moving on to a justification analysis whether in terms 
of the internal reasonableness test of sections 26(2) or 27(2) or the general 
limitations clause analysis under section 36. Again, the band of options is 
narrowed down with reference to the substance of the right before the State’s 
actions are analysed against those options.
This two-stage model of reasonableness analysis in both overlap and non-
overlap cases facilitates many of the core advantages of reasonableness review. 
Firstly, it brings the context of the relevant case to the fore. Context, both 
normative and factual, plays a pivotal role in assessing the reasonableness of 
the measures at stake. Secondly, since the model is highly contextual, review 
can be appropriately individualised. There is thus less danger of setting 
substantive standards that may be inappropriate in another context or time. 
Thirdly, the model promotes greater transparency in legal reasoning in that the 
competing value and policy considerations at stake, and the method and choices 
made in weighing them are openly acknowledged and set out in the judgment, 
including judicial justification for the level of scrutiny applied. This promotes 
greater transparency in legal reasoning and enables a principled development 
of factors informing judicial intervention and non-intervention.120 Since an 
assessment of the process and substance of the relevant measures are kept 
separate, there is less of a danger that these will be blurred with a resultant 
lack of transparency in the application of either one. Particular importance 
is accorded to the substantive dimensions of socio-economic rights in this 
model.
Despite the advantages noted above, our analysis indicates that the potential 
of a coherent reasonableness model of review has not been fully developed in 
the jurisprudence. The review standard in cases involving socio-economic 
rights has not been appropriately narrowed to reflect the particular purposes 
and values that these rights seek to advance. This leaves the judiciary ill 
equipped to play a significant role in catalysing the public and private measures 
required to give effect to the substantive commitments of our transformative 
Constitution.121
SUMMARY
This contribution explores the standard of reasonableness review applied in both administrative 
justice and socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa. The first part traces the development 
of reasonableness as a standard of review in administrative law, and the significant shift towards 
a more substantive conception of review. The implications of this shift for cases involving review 
of administrative action impacting on socio-economic rights (what we term, “overlap cases”) are 
examined. The second part of the contribution examines reasonableness review in socio-economic 
rights cases where the cause of action is not formulated in terms of administrative law (what we term, 
“non-overlap cases”). This typically concerns cases where it is alleged that the legislature or executive 
branches of government have failed to fulfil the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights. In 
this section we highlight the failure of existing constitutional jurisprudence on socio-economic rights 
120 See A Pillay “Reviewing Reasonableness: An Appropriate Standard for Evaluating State Action and 
Inaction?” (2005) 122 SALJ 419 420; Davis (2006) Acta Juridica 33
121 On the catalytic function of judicial review see K young “A Typology of Economic and Social Rights 
Adjudication: Exploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review” (2010) 8 I CON 385
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to develop a substantive account of the normative purposes and values promoted by these rights. We 
argue that it remains possible for such an account to be developed within the existing framework 
of reasonableness review applied to positive socio-economic rights claims. The paper concludes 
with an argument in favour of the development of a single model of reasonableness review across 
socio-economic rights and administrative justice cases. While the reasonableness standards under 
the different sections overlap, they should not result in duplication, but fulfil different functions in 
the review. Taken together, reasonableness offers a model of review of socio-economic rights that 
promotes a number of key constitutional objectives. These include transparency, the justification of all 
forms of public action, proper consideration of the factual and normative context, and the development 
of the substantive dimensions of the socio-economic rights in the Constitution.
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